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Abstract: In this paper, we present a preliminary glance on our framework for
protocol stack monitoring using Xen (ProMoX). ProMoX uses the Xen hypervisor
to virtualize entire instances of operating systems which may execute any arbitrary
protocol implementation. By utilizing system virtualization for external monitoring,
ProMoX can transparently inspect any protocol state and performance metrics of
protocol implementations carried by a guest operating system. This way, ProMoX
supports both the indentification of faults within early prototypes as well as the
evaluation of new protocol designs.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, overlay networks and peer-to-peer technologies have drawn much attention
in the network research community. Moreover, file sharing services like BitTorrent [4] as well
as overlay-based VoIP services such as Skype [3] have recently proved the potential of this
paradigm and are nowadays used by millions of users. Due to the popularity of Skype and
BitTorrent and standardization efforts like P2PSIP [1], it can be expected that more overlay-
based services will be commonly used in a little while and hence will diversify the Internet
landscape.
Directly linked to the proliferation of overlay services is the development and the implementa-
tion of respective network protocols. Network protocol stacks are tightly coupled to the underly-
ing operating systems, and core services are often implemented in the system kernel. Adequate
tools are required for debugging and monitoring the implementations’ execution, as well as for
evaluation purposes. In this regard, debugging tools such as GDB [13] and KGDB [8] as well as
full-system simulators like Simics [10] are commonly used to study the behavior of a protocol
implementation.
In the following, we focus on a different approach for the analysis of protocol implementa-
tions. We utilize system virtualization to facilitate transparent monitoring of a protocol imple-
mentation at run-time. A guest operating system which carries a network protocol implementa-
tion of choice is virtualized using a virtual machine monitor (VMM). The VMM is controlled
from a privileged control context. The privileged control context is able to inspect any resource
used by the virtualized guests, in particular network and memory usage. This way, the virtualiza-
tion environment can be used to explore the run-time behavior and the performance of a protocol
implementation. Moreover, the exploration of the implementation can be entirely carried out in
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Figure 1: ProMoX architecture
the control context, and hence, it is completely transparent for the system under investigation.
From this point, we will refer to this virtualization-assisted external monitoring as introspection.
The idea of applying introspection to the analysis of protocol implementations is the driving
motivation behind our framework for Protocol stack Monitoring using the Xen hypervisor (Pro-
MoX). ProMoX allows one to transparently monitor any protocol state using a privileged control
context. A detailed description of the ProMoX introspection architecture is given in Section 2,
before we discuss first insights about the system performance in Section 3. In fact, this is not the
first time that system virtualization has been used to ease such investigations of protocol stacks.
In Section 4, we compare ProMoX to related approaches. As ProMoX is in early stages, there
is a lot of room for improvement and enhancements. We outline this future work in Section 5,
before we conclude this paper in Section 6 with the essential findings of this paper.
2 ProMoX Architecture
In this section, we describe the architecture of ProMoX as depicted in Figure 1. ProMoX is based
on the Xen hypervisor that virtualizes instances of multiple operating systems. After a brief
description of Xen and its virtualization approach, we describe how the ProMoX framework can
be applied to monitor the internals of a protocol implementation using our modified version of
the XenAccess [11] introspection library.
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2.1 Xen-based virtualization
Since its introduction in 2003, Xen [2] has become one of the most used virtualization platforms
for x86 systems today. Xen is a virtual machine monitor that allows to execute multiple operating
systems concurrently on one physical machine. Such an operating system instance is called a
domain in the context of Xen. The Xen virtual machine monitor runs directly on top of the
hardware and coordinates the domains’ concurrent accesses to the shared resources of the host
system. Xen is based on the concept of para-virtualization, where the virtualized operating
system is aware of the virtualization environment and cooperates with the hypervisor.
In Xen one mandatory privileged control domain, the so-called domain 0, is in charge of
controlling the execution of host systems on the hypervisor using Xen’s control interface. For
example, the privileged control domain instantiates new domains and is capable of suspending
or terminating their execution at any time. In addition, it is noteworthy that all hosted operating
systems make use of the device drivers of domain 0 in order to access the system hardware, for
example a network interface.
In the x86 architecture, four different protection rings exist: ring 0, 1, 2 and ring 3. While com-
mon operating systems only use ring 0 for the execution of the kernel and ring 3 for applications,
this is different for a system where a Xen hypervisor is in place. In Xen’s implementation of
para-virtualization, the domains are executed in ring 1 and cooperate with the hypervisor which
resides in ring 0. In order to execute an operating system in ring 1, its kernel needs to be modi-
fied. Operating system commands, which need to access system resources that are managed by
Xen are replaced with so-called hypercalls. These hypercalls are handled by the Xen hypervi-
sor. Data between Xen and the hosted domains is exchanged using shared memory pages. The
major advantage of para-virtualization is the increased virtualization performance, as no system
calls have to be trapped, and no hardware has to be emulated in order to virtualize an operating
system.
A major drawback of earlier Xen versions was that they only supported para-virtualized guest
domains. The major disadvantage with para-virtualized guest systems is that they require mod-
ified operating systems kernels. Modified kernels are available for a couple of operating sys-
tems, most notably Linux and OpenSolaris. However, if one wants to enable the use of para-
virtualization for a particular operating system, he needs access to the kernel source code, which
essentially constrains the choice to open-source operating systems. To overcome this prob-
lem, Xen in version 3.0 introduced hardware assisted virtualization (HVM) as an alternative to
para-virtualization. Intel and AMD have equipped their processors with architectural extensions
(AMD-V, Intel VT) to support virtualization on CPU level. Starting with Xen 3.0, Xen uses these
extensions as a basis to allow the execution of arbitrary x86 operating systems. This is especially
important, as closed source systems like Windows can now be used on top of Xen. Our ProMoX
implementation operates with both types of domains and hence, conceptually facilitates external
monitoring of any protocol implementation based on a x86 operating system.
Of direct interest for the later discussed introspection is the memory management of Xen based
systems, where three different memory address types can be distinguished:
• Machine memory addresses are physical addresses which directly address the hardware
memory. These addresses are only directly used by the Xen hypervisor and XenAccess.
3 / 10 Volume 17 (2009)
ProMoX: A protocol stack monitoring framework
• Xen allocates a fraction of the physical memory to every domain, which is seen by the do-
main as its physical memory. The domains physical addresses are Xen’s pseudo-physical
memory addresses which are mapped to a machine memory addresses.
• Almost all guest operating systems rely on virtual memory and hence nearly all memory
addresses used in this context are in fact virtual memory addresses. As described in the
standard literature [12], this core concept is required for a couple of reasons, for example
paging.
Most remarkably, Xen provides every domain with an own pseudo-physical memory range.
Every domain operates only within this pseudo-physical address range, which yields to a strong
isolation of the domains against each other. Solely the privileged domain is able to access the
memory resources of other domains via Xen using specific hypercalls. Therefore, the ProMoX
monitoring instance as described in the following always needs to be placed in domain 0.
2.2 ProMoX Introspection
After the introduction to the Xen virtual machine monitor, we now describe how its virtualization
approach is used in ProMoX to facilitate the monitoring of arbitrary protocol stack implementa-
tions on x86 systems. ProMoX is based on two distinct building blocks, the ProMoX monitoring
instance and the XenAccess introspection library [11].
ProMoX monitoring instance
The central element of our monitoring framework is the ProMoX monitoring instance, which is
a user-level application being executed within the privileged domain. The monitoring instance
maintains a look-up table which contains virtual memory addresses of variables that contain the
system states one is interested to observe. These virtual addresses are obtained by using virtual
addresses from the system map as starting points and then traversing the data-structures of the
kernel. All accesses to the kernel memory of the guest system are established by using the
XenAccess library, which will be discussed in more detail later.
For example, if one is interested in exploring the connections of a TCP/IP stack, one required
entry in the look-up table would be the address of the struct which contains the information about
open connections, their port numbers and their destination addresses. However, the XenAccess
library only provides bare access to logical memory addresses and is not able to interpret the
raw memory stored at these addresses. Hence, a core functionality of the ProMoX monitoring
instance is to provide a view which abstracts from raw memory content and instead uses more
meaningful state descriptors. As a first step towards a comprehensive protocol-stack inspection
framework, we have implemented a set of methods to inspect a range of properties of the Linux
2.6 TCP/IP stack for guests which operate this kernel. So far, the ProMoX implementation
allows the inspection of open TCP or UDP connections and facilitates the access to important
protocol information, such as the current TCP window size. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
supplying an abstract view on a protocol state requires transparent memory lookups with a partial
re-implementation of the protocol logic inside ProMoX. For example, in order to output a list of
all open TCP connections of a hosted Linux system, ProMoX first obtains the global protocol
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state and iterates over all allocated socket buffers, for which each an individual XenAccess look-
up is required. As such introspections may take a significant amount of time, it is beneficial that
our ProMoX implementation and our modified XenAccess implementation in fact also facilitates
the analysis of suspended domains. Moreover, Xen allows to take snapshots of a running domain
at any point in time which ProMoX is capable to inspect as well.
The maximum achievable monitoring rate of ProMoX is directly dependent on the domain
scheduling provided by the Xen hypervisor. Xen schedules the execution of domains in a similar
fashion like a OS scheduler coordinates execution of concurrent processes. Hence, the achievable
monitoring rate is directly dependent on the used scheduling scheme. The Xen distribution
currently provides two schedulers in this regard, a credit-based scheduler and a scheduler that
implements a EDF scheme. For a different purpose, we have extensively modified the EDF
scheduler of Xen to allow domains to be executed for an exact amount of time [14]. By utilizing
this modified scheduler, it is possible to achieve a monitoring rate of up to 10µs.
XenAccess Introspection Library
The core task of the XenAccess library is to enable the convenient access to virtual addresses
within a executed guest domain, as this is required to access a protocol stack’s internals from the
control context. The actual look-up process of a protocol state descriptor involves several steps:
1. The ProMoX monitoring instance determines the virtual address of the state descriptor
variable using the look-up table.
2. The XenAccess library identifies the address of the page table within the corresponding
domain.
3. XenAccess traverses the guest domain’s page table in order to determine the machine
address (in case of HVM the pseudo-physical address) of the protocol state descriptor.
4. Once the corresponding machine address (in case of HVM the pseudo-physical address
is automatically translated to the corresponding machine address) has been identified, the
corresponding memory region is mapped into the address space of the privileged domain,
thus enabling the introspection using a set of shared memory pages.
As a part of our work on ProMoX, we have extensively modified and extended the original
implementation of XenAccess, first by completing its implementation for the inspection of HVM
domains. Moreover, we added 64bit support to the introspection library. XenAccess now exe-
cutes on any 64bit system and is even capable to inspect 32bit guest domains if the hypervisor
and domain 0 operate in 64bit mode. Another issue is given by the size of state descriptors: The
original XenAccess only allowed to inspect symbols which are smaller than one memory page
(4kb). However, if one is interested in the introspection of more complicated data structures, a
problem may arise if such a data structure spans across multiple memory pages. In order to han-
dle this problem, we extended XenAccess in a way that it supports data structures which exceed
the page size limit. In addition, we rewrote the entire XenAccess page table look-up procedure
to support large page tables and Xen versions greater than 3.0.
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Domain type Caching No Caching
Para-virtualized 13µs 59µs
HVM 13µs 26µs
Table 1: ProMoX introspection times
3 ProMoX Performance
As ProMoX is slated to monitor a protocol stack in a concurrent fashion, it is important that
protocol state descriptors can be inspected efficiently. In order to keep track of sudden state
changes, it is usually required to sample a protocol state descriptor at a high rate. Thus, it is
important to carry out the look-ups efficiently, with the goal of keeping the impact of the overall
system performance in reasonable bounds. In the following, we provide first results regarding the
monitoring performance of ProMoX and a discussion of the achievable monitoring resolution.
All performance measurements were conducted on an AMD Athlon 64 3800+ workstation with
2GB of RAM, running ProMoX on top of Xen 3.2. For both the control domain and the inspected
guest domain, we used Linux with the kernel version 2.6.18.8-xen.
3.1 Introspection performance
In order to investigate the look-up performance, we measured the duration of one introspection
of a kernel-level address inside the Linux guest domain. The results were obtained by averaging
over 5000 measurements. Table 1 shows these introspection times for both domain types. As a
matter of fact, XenAccess internally maintains a cache for the mapping of virtual addresses to
pseudo-physical addresses. In order to measure the influence of this cache, we repeated the ex-
periment, performing the introspection on 5000 different virtual addresses instead, which leads
to a cache miss for every introspection. As our results show, caching the pseudo-physical ad-
dresses improves the performance significantly. There is a remarkable performance difference
between a non-cached introspection in a HVM domain and the para-virtualized case. We explain
this result with the hardware support of the used processor. The evaluation machine was a AMD
Athlon 64 processor with AMD-V extensions. AMD-V supports the virtualization of page tables
in hardware. XenAccess is able to directly access the guest domain’s page table in the HVM
case. In contrast to this, XenAccess first needs to obtain a guest domain’s page table by mapping
it as a shared memory page if para-virtualization is used.
3.2 Monitoring resolution
Of direct interest for monitoring protocol stack implementations is the ability to observe protocol
state changes accurately. As our approach of monitoring a protocol stack is entirely passive, the
state descriptors must be inspected regularly at an adequate rate in order to detect such state
changes. While the required monitoring rate is highly dependent on the respective protocol state,
the achievable monitoring rate and hence the maximum monitoring resolution is limited by the
virtualization environment, as the scheduler of the virtualization environment essentially assigns
discrete run-time slices to the domains.
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Figure 2: Partial trace of TCP Congestion window size (obtained using ProMoX prototype)
In order to determine the performance of ProMoX in this regard, we traced the congestion
window size of the Linux TCP/IP stack for one connection from the guest domain to a different
host. A partial trace of the congestion window size is depicted in Figure 2. The results obtained
with ProMoX reflect the well-known slow start behavior of TCP. This preliminary result shows
that ProMoX is able to capture the behavior of rapidly changing protocol state descriptors, given
the fact that the congestion window size changes with every received acknowledgement packet.
4 Related Work
The investigation of network protocol stacks and related debugging tasks are often carried out us-
ing kernel-level debuggers or full-system simulators. Kernel-level debuggers such as kgdb [8] or
the Rasta Ring 0 Debugger [5] allow the inspection of kernel-level implementations. In compari-
son to a virtualization-based approach for the investigation of network protocol implementations,
debugging tools debuggers are executed in the same context as the investigated subject. While
this eases the access to data structures and protocol state descriptors, the monitoring process is
less isolated from the studied protocol implementation.
Full system simulators such as Simics [10] model the entire machine hardware and its periph-
erals in software, and unmodified operating systems can be executed on the modeled system.
The key strength of full system simulators is their flexibility, as any property of the modeled
machine can be changed in an arbitrary fashion. Many full system simulators provide a plug-in
interface to the system simulation, which one could use for protocol monitoring. However, the
simulation of the entire machine hardware naturally bears a lot of overhead, and in spite of many
optimizations, full system simulations execute at least 5-10 times slower than a real system. For
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this reason, it is hard to employ full system simulators for protocol monitoring, as one is typically
interested in observing real-time interactions with multiple hosts.
A popular application area for virtual machine introspection is intrusion detection as first pro-
posed in [6]. In their paper, Garfinkel and Rosenblum use a modified version of VMWare Work-
station for Linux as virtual machine monitor to provide a sandbox for an operating system, which
can be introspected from a control context. The actual intrusion detection is then carried out by
analyzing the information retrieved from the introspection, for example by hashing memory re-
gions of the running guest operating system. In this case, the hash values are used to detect a
possible tampering of the running operating system kernel. While the architecture and the no-
tion of introspection is very similar to our work, the authors are merely interested in identifying
persistent changes in a virtual machine, for example the installation of a root-kit. However, if
introspection is applied to the monitoring of protocol stack implementations, one is typically
interested in observing short-term state changes.
In general, the need for development tools of massively distributed systems has been addressed
lately by others as well. A recent and very exciting example is D3S [9], which allows a dis-
tributed system to be checked against predicates while it is executed. In their paper, the authors
demonstrate its capabilities by applying it to a Chord and a BitTorrent implementation. D3S uses
binary code instrumentation in order to export internal system states to the observing instances.
While binary code instrumentation works well for application-layer protocol implementations,
it is difficult to employ for protocol stacks that are tightly integrated in the operating systems
kernel.
5 Future Work
As mentioned earlier, ProMoX is in very early stages, and hence our future work mainly focuses
on the extension of the framework. A major challenge of ProMoX is given by the fact that it
currently requires a lot of knowledge about the implementation, for example, the exact structure
of a protocol state descriptor. Currently, we are working on a more convenient solution which
automatically provides ProMoX with this required information, for example by marking the
protocol state descriptor in the implementation’s source code.
Up to now, ProMoX merely samples a protocol state descriptor in a periodic manner. However,
very high sampling rates are required to observe communication links of high bandwidth. There-
fore we currently investigate an alternative event-based scheme. More specifically, we explore
the possibility of monitoring stack internals at the occurrence of particular system events. We are
currently working on the invocation of ProMoX at the time network packets are exchanged in
this regard, by using a modified driver back-end in the privileged control domain. This way, we
hope to facilitate the intercorrelation of network traffic with internal state changes of a protocol
implementation.
Another challenge to be addressed by future work is the application of ProMoX to closed-
source operating systems. So far, ProMoX is able inspect the TCP/IP stack of Linux 2.6, besides
custom protocol implementations. In the case of closed-source operating systems, the look-
up process has to be modified in order to match the guest operating system virtual memory
management.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a first outlook on our ProMoX architecture for the virtualization-
based external monitoring of protocol stack implementations. ProMoX is based on the Xen
hypervisor and utilizes the XenAccess introspection library for its monitoring purposes. ProMoX
is able to access the protocol stack internals of both running and suspended virtualized systems.
Our preliminary evaluation results have shown that ProMoX is able to monitor a fast-changing
protocol state variable accordingly.
In comparison to established monitoring approaches such as kernel level debuggers, frame-
works such as ProMoX that are based on system virtualization deliver a higher degree of trans-
parency. The monitoring process is executed in a privileged context and not within the context
of the system under investigation. However, this comes at increased costs in terms of imple-
mentation complexity and run-time efforts, due to the need of externally traversing through the
system’s memory management and due to the necessity of parsing internal data structures.
All in all, we regard our work as a proof of concept for virtualization-based external monitor-
ing of protocol implementations. We anticipate systems such as ProMoX not only for research
and development purposes. It is imaginable that future systems will always be executed within a
virtualization environment. In this case, monitoring frameworks like ProMoX could be used to
monitor a protocol stack continuously, both for the detection of faults and for general run-time
analyses of the deployed system.
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